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to render final judgment for defendant; in fact, it would have been
error for it not to have done so. 2 The federal rule laid down in the
Slocum case," is based on the right of trial by jury guaranteed by the
7th Amendment to the United State Constitution; it is said that when
a verdict is set aside the issues are left undetermined, and until they are
determined in a jury trial no judgment on the merits can be given. In
a persuasive dissent written by Hughes, J., and concurred in by Holmes,
Lurton, and Pitney, JJ., the view is expressed that the rendition of
final judgment by the reviewing court would not be a violation of the
7 th Amendment since the court would be deciding a question of law,
not of fact, that is, whether there was sufficient evidence to go to the
jury. In a later case 4 the Supreme Court sustained the rule of the
Slocum case without a dissent. The Ohio Supreme Court finds no
constitutional difficulty in rendering final judgment,2" relying on an
argument similar to that expressed in the dissenting opinion in the
Slocum case. Moreover, the Ohio courts are authorized by statute to
render final judgment in such cases. H. M. M.
REAL PROPERTY
REAL PROPERTY - TERMINATION OF A LEASE BY
FORECLOSURE OF PRIOR MORTGAGE
In 1926, Kenyon Painter executed a mortgage to the plaintiff, the
New York Life Insurance Company, and in 1931 leased the premises
for a seventy-month term to the Simplex Products Corporation, defend-
ant in the case at bar. The defendant paid rent to Painter until Sep-
tember, 1933, when by agreement payment of part of the rent was
made to the plaintiff while the remainder was paid to the Union Trust
Company, which held a mortgage on the residue of the leased property.
In December, 1934, the plaintiff brought an action to foreclose his
mortgage, but failed to join the defendant-lessee as a party. Plaintiff
dict, the reviewing court can render final judgment rather than remand the case for a new
trial if it holds that there was not sufficient evidence to go to the jury. Baltim. & Carol.
Line v. Redman, 55 Sup. Ct. 89o. Note 45 Yale L.J. 166 (1935) zs Ia. L. Rev. 117
( 5 Majoros v. Cleve. Lner. Rd. Co., 127 Ohio St. z5g, 187 N.E. 857 (1933); Crey-
hound Lines v. Martin, 127 Ohio St. 499, 189 N.E. 244, 14 Ohio L. Abs. 327 (934)i
Lakeside Hosp. v. Kover, 131 Ohio St. 333, z N.E. (2d) 857, 6 Ohio Op. 54 (1936).
23 See note 21, supra.
24 Pederson v. Del., L. & W. R. Co., note 22, supra.
"
1 Keller v. Stark Elec. Ry. Co., ioz Ohio St. 254, 13o N.E. 5o8, sz Ohio App. 3z6
(292i); Ellis and Morton v. Ohio Life Ins. Co. , 4 Ohio St. 628, 64. Am. Dec. 6zo, i
Hand. 97, sz Ohio Dec. Rep. 47, 1 Hand. i9, sz Ohio Dec. Rep. 58 (1855).
2 G.C. sec. 2Z223-38.
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subsequently bought in at a foreclosure sale. The defendant thereafter
continued paying the rent to the plaintiff until June, 1935. The present
action was brought for the collection of rent for the months of Decem-
ber, 1935, to May, 1936, inclusive. Saying that the purchase of the
property at the foreclosure sale operated to terminate the lease and that
the subsequent monthly payments of the rent created a periodic tenancy,
the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the defendant was liable for the
rent only for the periods of occupancy.'
Assuming that the lessee is made a party to the foreclosure proceed-
ings and that there is no subsequent attornment, all jurisdictions seem to
be agreed that the foreclosure of a prior mortgage will terminate a sub-
sequent lease where there is no statute to the contrary.2 And this rule
applies as effectively where the mortgagee-purchaser attempts to treat
the lease as continuing, bringing action for the collection of rent,' as
where he desires the lease terminated.4 The theory is that the purchaser
at a foreclosure sale of a prior mortgage does not take the reversionary
interest of the mortgagor. The transfer of interest is regarded as occur-
ring as of the time when the mortgage was executed, and the enforce-
ment of that mortgage operates to extinguish subsequent encumberances
on the property.' It is to be noted that, although the bases for this rule
is apparently the protection of the interests of the prior mortgage, it is
held, nevertheless, to operate to his disadvantage in denying him the
right to receive rent which accrues after the sale.
There is a marked split in the decisions where the lessee is not joined
as a party to the foreclosure, the majority rule being that the lease in
such event is not terminated.6 The theory underlying this doctrine is
that for the decree of foreclosure to operate as against one who has an
interest in the property such as a lessee, it is necessary that he be joined as
a party.' In the jurisdictions where this rule operates, it is applied as
readily for the advantage of the purchaser at the foreclosure sale where
'NV, x York Life Insurance Co. v. Simplex Products Corporation, 135 Ohio St. 5ox,
zI N.E. (2d) i85, 14 Ohio Op. 396 (I939).
'Peters v. Elkins, 14 Ohio Reports 344 (1846); Dolese v. Bellows-Claude-Neon
Co., z6I Mich. 57, 245 N.V. 569 (193z); Waigreen Co. v. Moore, ii6 N. J. Eq. 348,
173 Adt. 587 (1934).
a Peters v. Elkins, supra.
4 Doccnard v. Graff, 40 Iowa 597 (1875).
TFFANY, (x ed. 19 1 o) LANDLORD AND TENANT, p. I I 18.
0 Walgreen v. Moore, supra; Mfetropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Childs, Z30 N. Y.
285, 13o N.E. 295, 14 A.L.R. 658 ('9z), Gale v. Carter, 154 11. App. 478, 164 II.
App. 545 (x9io); Dundee Naval Stores Co. v. McDowell, 6S Fla. iS, 61 So. IoS, Ann.
Cas. 1915 A, 384 (x9x3). However many jurisdictions hold that the failure to join the
les ce doei not operate to preserve the lease. Dolese v. Bellows-Claude-Neon Co., supra;
McDermott v. Burke, et al., x6 Cal. 58o (x86o); Western Union Telegraps Co. v. Ann
Arbor R. R. Co., 90 Fed. 379 (x898); 14 A.L.R. 664.
14Z C.J., p. 59.
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he wishes to treat the lease as continuing8 as for the benefit of the lessee
desiring to prevent ouster.' To uphold the mortgagee-purchaser's right
to collect the rent where the lessee is not joined in the foreclosure, these
jurisdictions treat the reversion of the mortgagor as passing to the
mortgagee-purchaser."0
In the case of Nunn v. Hutchison" the Court of Appeals of Summit
County, at the suit of a lessee, enjoined the sheriff from disturbing
lessee's possession by a writ of possession because the lessee was not made
a party to the mortgage foreclosure. This case was relied upon by the
plaintiff in the case at bar as indicating that Ohio required the lessee to
be made a party to the foreclosure proceedings in order to terminate the
lease. It may be noted, however, that the parties' rights in the property
were not passed upon in the Nunn case, the court relying upon the
principle that: "Writ of possession can be used only against parties to
foreclosure suit."' 2 This decision seems consistent with the underlying
theory of the majority doctrine, in that it protects the lessee where his
rights have not been passed upon in the foreclosure proceedings. The
inconsistency arises in jurisdictions where the mortgagee-purchaser is
permitted to rely on this rule as a basis for the continuation of the lease.
In these jurisdictions the mortgagee, by intentionally excluding the
lessee as a party to the foreclosure, may obtain the benefits of the lease
over the lessee's objection by the operation of a rule which exists for the
benefit of the lessee and to protect his interests.
All of the authorities are agreed that even after the termination of
the lease by foreclosure sale under a prior mortgage, the lessee by recog-
nizing (i.e. "attorning" to) the purchaser, and the latter by accepting
the lessee as his tenant, may create the relationship of landlord and ten-
ant. The attornment may be made expressly or by implication, as in
the payment and acceptance of rent. 3 A conflict exists as to whether
the original lease governs the tenancy or whether a new tenancy is
created, the terms of which are determined by the facts surrounding the
attornment. Most courts hold that the lessee's acknowledgment of the
mortgagee as landlord creates a tenancy at will which may mature into
a periodic tenancy upon the periodic payment of the rent. 4 Behind this
is the conception that the reversionary interest fails to pass to the mort-
8 Ellveay Newspaper Workers, etc. v. Wagner Market Co., zio N.J.L. 577, x66
Atl. 332 (1933)5 Metrolopitan Life Insurance Co. v. Childs, supra.
0 Brush v. Fowler, 36 Ill. 53, 85 Am. Dec. 38Z (1864).
10 Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Childs, supra; Ellveay Newspaper Workers, etc.
v. Wagner Market Co., supra.11 1 Ohio L. Abs. 283 (1922).
'2 Syllabus 3, Nun v. Hutchison, supra.
is TiFFANY, (x ed. igio) LANDLORD AND TENANT, p. 411-
1 Cartside v. Outley, 58 Ill. 210, ix Am. Rep. 59 (871); Burke v. Willard, 24-3
Mass. 547, 137 N.E. 744 (1923).
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-agee-purchaser. These courts hold that, since this reversion of the
mortgagor is not acquired by the purchaser at the mortgage foreclosure
sale, there is no privity of estate or contract between the purchaser and
the mortgagor's lessee.15 Unless in some manner the mortgagee-
purchaser acquires the reversionary interest of the mortgagor upon fore-
closure, there seems to be no legal foundation for regarding the old
lease as continuing. New York, New Jersey, and Texas have held that
the attornment by payment of rent binds the leasee for the term of the
original lease.'" But these are jurisdictions which treat the reversionary
interest of the mortgagor as passing to the purchaser when the lessee
is not made a party to the foreclosure.
We may approach the problem raised by the principal case from the
points of view of two separate groups of jurisdictions. First, consider
the minority jurisdictions which hold that the foreclosure sale operates
to terminate the lease, regardless of the failure to make the lessee a party
to the foreclosure. 7 In treating the mortgagor's reversionary interest
as not passing to the mortgagee-purchaser even where there is a subse-
quent attornment, these courts are consistent in their approach and afford
a reliable rule for predicting the effect of a foreclosure sale on tides and
interests. On the other hand, it may be noted that in the principal case
the defendant-lessee is enabled to take advantage of a situation which he
had not contemplated when entering into the lease or at any time there-
after, and to benefit by a rule which is based upon the protection of the
prior mortgagee as against junior encumbrancers. The plaintiff-mort-
gagee evidently proceeded with the foreclosure of his mortgage believing
that he would continue to receive the rentals for the remainder of the
lessee's term, and the lessee by his continued monthly payments indicated
that he regarded the lease as continuing after the foreclosure. Had the
mortgagee known that the foreclosure sale would operate to terminate
the lease, he might well have refrained from foreclosing the mortgage,
accepting the monthly payments of rent until the term had expired.
Would a more desirable decision have been reached in the majority
jurisdictions which hold that the lease is not terminated when the lessee
is not made a party to the foreclosure?"8 The plaintiff would have
prevailed in any of these jurisdictions, but it may be questioned whether
the decision should turn on the failure of the mortgagee to make the
'-,IMcarland Real Estate Co. v. Joseph Gerardi Hotel Co., zoz Mo. 597 (i9°6).
1" clly v. Osborne, 17z App. Div. 6, 157 N.Y.S. ssoo (1916); Ellveay Newspaper
Wor:rs, Ce. v. Wagner Market Co., supra; Peck and Hills Furniture Co. v. Long, 68
S.W. (2d) zS8 (Texas, 1934).
" Supra, note S. As a result of the decisions in Peters v. Elkins, supra, and in the
ca e at bar, it it apparent that Ohio may be included in this group of jurisdictions.
" Supra, note s.
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lessee a party to the foreclosure proceedings, since such application again
involves employing a rule which has its basis in the protection of the
rights of the party against whose interest it is utilized. Hardship might
be worked against the lessee as in the case of Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Company v. Childs9 where the lessee, in reliance upon a fore-
closure proceeding to which he was made a party, vacated the premises,
only to find later that the mortgagee had withdrawn his name as a
party to the foreclosure shortly before the actual sale.
In Curry v. Bacharach Quality Shops Inc.,2" the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held that by force of the operation of a statute2" of that
state, the purchaser at a mortgage foreclosure had the option of affirm-
ing or disaffirming a subsequent lease, but, having once affirmed the
lease he stood in the position of assignee of the reversion and could not
subsequently disavow the lease. By statute22 the interests of the lessee
are also protected so that he cannot be dispossessed unless the mortgagee-
purchaser makes him a party to the foreclosure (scire facias in Pennsyl-
vania)." The Pennsylvania solution appears to the writer to be a happy
one. It is definite in that it confers upon one party, the purchaser, the
right and obligation of determining whether or not the lease shall con-
tinue in effect; and at the same time it protects the lessee from eviction
where he has not been notified of the disaffirmance of the lease.
D. A. W.
TORTS
TORTS -F ORMS OF ACTION - TRESPASS - BATTERY
OR NEGLIGENCE
A sheriff was pursuing an escaping misdemeanant who had previ-
ously been arrested by him. While engaged in the pursuit the sheriff
fired several shots intending to frighten the misdemeanant into stop-
ping; one of the bullets struck the plaintiff, a bystander in the public
street. The Court of Appeals for the Third District held the sheriff
liable to such person saying that the sheriff "commits an act of trespass
against the person so injured."'
At early common law an action in trespass could be maintained
whenever the injury was direct and with force. Hence, an action could
be maintained in trespass if the plaintiff could prove that the defendant
"e Supra, note 5.
21 271 Pa. 364, 117 Atl. 435 (92).
2122 P.S., Sec. 2611 (1836).
12 i P.S., Sec. 309 (i9oi).
23 Nevil v. Heinke, 2z Pa. Super. 614 (1903).
"Young v. Kelly, 6o Ohio App. 382, zi N.E. (zd) 6oz (938).
